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Seen in the perspective of cultural history, the 
contemporary movement to grant animals a moral status 
equal to that of human beings represents the final and 
catastrophic stage of a progressive crisis ofconfidence 
within our Western civilisation. Having abandoned first 
our belief in the proven superiority of our culture over 
all others, then our belief in the natural superiority of 
men over women, we are now urged to abandon also 
our belief in the intrinsic superiority ofhumankind over 
the beasts. The causes contributing to this last loss of 
self-esteem are no doubt various and conflicting: 
vegetarianism, the ecological movement, horror at the 
medical and industrial exploitation of animals, the 
influence of Indian religions, and a realisation of the 
remoter consequences of the rationalistic conception 
ofman; somemight also see in it perhaps an intellectual 
expression of the lapse into bestiality against which 
Biblical writers often warned the impious. Hitherto the 
philosophical debate concerning the moral status of 
animals has been conducted almost entirely within the 
English-speaking world, largely on account of its 
traditional concern for animals and its affinity for 
utilitarianism, which can more readily accommodate 
animals than the Kantianism dominant in continental 
Europe; recently, however, the debate has been taken 
up in Germany, and this book by Professor Ursula Wolf 
of Berlin is one of the first philosophical contributions 
to it from that country. 
As we might expect of a work by a German 
philosopher, the discussion of theoretical issues 
occupies the most important place in it, although it is 
plain that the authoress is well acquainted also with 
practical matters; the most original parts of the book 
indeed are those devoted to general moral theory, and 
it is to these that I shall largely confine myself. Much 
of this discussion of the fundamental questions ofethics 
is presented by way ofa criticism of other writers, both 
Gennan (Kant, Schopenhauer, Tugendhat) and English 
(Singer, Clark, Rorty, and others), but in appraising 
Professor Wolf's arguments I shall as far as possible 
abstract these from their critical context. 
The central argument of the book is contained in 
the third of its five chapters (especially pp. 69-81) and 
is, as I understand it, the following. There can be no 
ultimate grounding of ethics, but the most reasonable 
(sinnvoll) moral theory is a "liberal" ethics, distin­
guished by the absence ofmetaphysical pretensions and 
the equal status it accords all human beings. However, 
because no empirical property can be found equally 
distributed amongst men to justify its egalitarian 
conclusions, liberal ethics has to presuppose the equal 
possession by human beings of some non-empirical 
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property such as reason or intrinsic worth. By 
eliminating this inconsistency and so "radicalising" 
liberal ethics, we find that the only empirical property 
shared equally by all human beings is the capacity to 
suffer (Leidensftlhigkeit); but this property is shared by 
most, if not all animals, who must therefore also enjoy 
the status of objects of moral concern. This "ethics of 
generalised sympathy" (or "pity," Mitleid> of itself 
provides only the core of an ethical theory,· not any 
concrete norm such as that no suffering may be inflicted 
without good reason; but the adoption of this standpoint 
implies the attribution to the objects of such sympathy 
of certain rights, from which in tum follow certain 
obligations towards them. Those parts of ethics which 
are not essentially concerned with individuals lie outside 
the scope of this theory, however. 
Despite its simplicity, Professor Wolf's argument 
requires clarification at a number ofpoints. It remained 
unclear to me whether she offers her ethics of 
generalised sympathy as the only moral theory she 
herselfcan accept, as the one she recommends to others, 
as the one actually held implicitly by most people, as 
the only one which withstands philosophical criticism, 
or as the only one able to justify the condemnation of 
the contemporary treatment of animals. This unclarity 
is in part a consequence of an unclarity in the method 
followed in establishing this moral theory: despite her 
criticisms of other theories, Professor Wolf states that 
none of them are simply false; they are rather one-sided 
(57), since each implies a certain approach (Sichtweise); 
but although she promises to explain how one can argue 
about the plausibility of approaches (55), it is not evident 
to me that she does so. 
Professor Wolf, furthermore, does not distinguish 
explicitly between the three senses in which sympathy 
is generalised in her theory, namely (i) from human 
beings to animals (or some of them) (49, 76), (ii) from 
short-lived (punktuell) episodes of physical pain to the 
entire weal br woe, in Schopenhauer's phrase, of all 
sentient beings (88, 1(0), and (iii) from an emotion 
(Ajfekt) or sympathetic feeling (MitgeftihD to a consistent 
attitude (Einstel!ung) or stance (Grundhaltung) which 
can alone provide the basis of a morality (51-2,85,97, 
143); these three generalisations are however inde­
pendent one of another, and each gives rise to peculiar 
difficulties. First, although there are unquestionably 
many similarities between man and the higher animals, 
it is too much to speak here, as she suggests, of 
continuities (36, 95); Professor Wolf herself admits that 
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afiimals' relationship to their own welfare is less self­
aware or conceptualised (rejlektierO than man's (76): 
but self-awareness essentially makes a difference of 
kind, not of degree, and it is difficult to see how in the 
absence of conceptualisation animals can pursue their 
own good consciously as their good. Second, the 
equivalence between the capacity to suffer, thriving or 
ailing (gut oder schlecht gehen), and willing or striving 
towards one's own good has to be demonstrated and 
not simply asserted (76,89,94-5). ProfessorWolf insists 
that sympathy is directed upon the sufferer, not upon 
the state of suffering as such (49, 52), and that elemental 
(elementar) or uninterpreted suffering must be given 
greater weight than interpreted suffering (78); but she 
overlooks the fact that the more elemental the suffering 
the less the identity of the sufferer is relevant to the 
response it evokes, and she herself questions whether 
there is any pain or suffering which is perceived without 
interpretation or as such, even by the sufferer (79). 
Third, Professor Wolf simply leaves unexplained the 
transition from the feeling of sympathy to the standpoint 
ofconcern for others' suffering, which reintroduces into 
ethics Kantian notions of consistency and universality: 
when we act in accordance with some principle to 
relieve suffering which occasions us no vicarious pain, 
we act as rational beings in a way which sympathetic 
feelings of themselves cannot make intelligible. 
ProfessorWolfnever, tomymind, makes it perfectly 
clear whether she attributes to animals exactly the same 
moral status as that ofman or some other, partly because 
she characterises the opposed position variously as 
attributing a weaker, different, or unequal status to them, 
partly because she draws no explicit distinction between 
the possession of an equal status and the equal 
possession of a status; the latter expression is strictly a 
tautology, for a status is either possessed or not, there 
are no degrees ofpossession, whereas different statuses 
may be ranked by some principle. The claim that 
animals enjoy some status or other within morality is 
not implausible, although my own view is that they bear 
at most a quasi-status by analogy with human beings; 
the claim that animals share the very same moral status 
as human beings is absurd, and would be inconsistent 
with the concession that animals do not possess the same 
rights as man (104-5), for a status is constituted precisely 
by the rights and duties associated with it. 
The nature of the transition from the standpoint of 
generalised sympathy to the attribution of rights to 
the objects of such sympathy is left obscure, because 
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the author says both that the two ate simply different 
formulations of the same (81) and that the former 
"generates" or "constitutes" the latter (81, 83); she 
also dismisses difficulties with the idea of animal rights 
on the grounds that animals cannot lay claim to them 
as a mere dispute about words (40). The whole 
conception of rights seems foreign to an ethics of 
sympathy, however, for sympathy or pity is precisely 
the response evoked by suffering where all formal 
claims to consideration are absent; that is, I believe, 
the case with animals, and consequently moral regard 
for them springs rather from generosity, not from a 
recognition of their rights. 
Professor Wolf regards rights as conceptually prior 
to obligations (81, 88), on these grounds criticising Kant 
for the contrary view (40), and allows that there can 
therefore be rights without corresponding obligations 
(82, 90, 148). In fact, her own view makes it easier to 
understand how there can be obligations without 
corresponding rights, for once the notion of obligation 
has been established via rights, it can then be extended 
independently of the latter, as with animals-if, that is, 
one can speak of an obligation to be generous at all. 
In contrast to her central argument, much of 
Professor Wolf's discussion elsewhere of particular 
moral issues, such as vivisection (21-8) and the sanctity 
of human life (129-33), is clear and, given her 
assumptions, decisive, and these parts of her book may 
well be found most useful by readers. Nevertheless there 
are errors: one cannot say both that the attitude of 
extended sympathy is compatible with the view that 
man is incomparably more important than animals (53) 
and that it has been shown to follow from the ethics of 
sympathy that animals have the same moral status as 
man (55); on the other hand, there is no incompatibility 
between the positions of Midgley or Diamond and that 
of Becker (54-5), because the second term of 
comparison is not the same; the claim that Kantian 
ethical positions cannot justify the condemnation of tax 
evasion (84) overlooks the first formulation of the 
categorical imperative; and the argument that inanimate 
nature is entitled to less respect than animate because a 
stone, say, can be broken up into smaller stones without 
losing its petrosity (Steinsein, 139) succumbs to the 
obvious counterexamples ofpulverisation and smelting. 
It is not, I think, unfair to say that Professor Wolf's 
conception of morality, with its stress upon concern for 
individuals as a response to need rather than as a 
response to worthiness for protection (76), is an 
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essentially feminine one; by that I intend no 
disparagement, for the value of such feminine concern 
is beyond question; but rather than constituting a 
morality, or even the core of one, such concern rather 
supplements or corrects morality, rather as equity 
supplements common law in the English legal system, 
or mercy tempers justice in Christian theology. And 
indeed there are signs in her book that the authoress is 
not entirely happy with her own argument: the 
confidence she expresses in it varies markedly, and at 
times disconcertingly (87), and the tone becomes 
noticeably tentative at crucial points (74, 80, 120, 123); 
she frequently breaks off the argument or postpones 
further discussion of difficulties; and although she 
roundly declares that she can make nothing of absolute 
values (69) and even more radically that "nothing has a 
value, not even man" (142), she seems fascinated 
throughout her book by the very idea of some higher or 
intrinsic worth in man, recurs repeatedly to Christian 
morality, and gives a sympathetic account of Jewish 
teaching on animals (133-5). She herself would not 
seem entirely free, then, of the longing (Sehnsucht) for 
a foundation ofmorality to which she alludes (62); and 
at times (95, 110-1, 114-6, 144) her policy of raising 
the moral status of animals appears to spring less from 
concern for their sufferings than from a fear of the 
consequences of granting man no higher status; but, as 
the example of Hindu culture may warn us, the 
consequences of such a policy could be worse for all, 
animals included. To defend unwelcome conclusions 
because they follow from some metaphysical or anti­
metaphysical doctrine to which one is committed is in 
the end not a proof of rationality or constancy of 
purpose, but rather of inflexibility and desperation: it 
would be more rational to regard the argument as a 
reductio ad absurdum of the initial assumption and to 
look elsewhere for one's starting-point. Altogether, I 
felt, Professor Wolf's book had something about it of 
the spiritlessness and uncertainty of direction 
characteristic not only of a culture which has lost faith 
in itself, but also of a philosophical school which has 
largely abandoned its own tradition for the half-hearted 
espousal of another. 
Professor Wolf's pessimism concerning the 
possibility of a rational grounding of ethics, and her 
desire to propose an ethical theory free of metaphysical 
assumptions, may arise in part from a misapprehension 
concerning the nature of metaphysics. However 
dogmatically metaphysical doctrines may be presented 
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by their advocates, they actually arise and gain their 
plausibility from a reflexion upon experience and an 
abstraction from it of its most significant features; a 
perfect harmony between experience and its simplified, 
philosophical representation is not therefore to be 
expected, and the task offurther philosophical reasoning 
is precisely to reconcile recalcitrant data with the 
metaphysical principle. If one is seeking an empirical 
basis for a metaphysical distinction between man and 
other animals, one may well find it in the fact mentioned 
by Professor Wolf in passing (118) that man is the 
universal enemy of animals in the wild. This instinctive 
fear can hardly be explained in evolutionary terms, for 
most species have not known man long enough for 
natural selection to operate; rather it would seem that 
there is in animals an obscure awareness, perhaps akin 
to awe, that in man they are confronted with a being 
superior in kind to themselves whom they cannot 
comprehend. This suggestion complements the ideas 
of R. Leicht reported by Professor Wolf with apparent 
approval (138) that in dealing with liminal forms of 
human existence (such as embryos) we are made aware 
of the indefeasible limits to our own self-understanding, 
and ought therefore to show respect for something 
necessarily lying beyond our ken; such ideas offer in 
my view the most promising approach to these issues, 
although Professor Wolf's own attempts to develop 
thembymeans ofan analogy with artistic understanding 
(138-40) I consider frankly misguided. 
The book leaves a certain amount to be desired in 
purely technical respects. It is sometimes unclear 
whether the writer is expounding others' ideas or her 
own (72-3, 75, 77-8), a fault less readily excused in 
German which has the subjunctive at its disposal for 
reported speech; and she makes a practice of giving 
indefinite references, especially forwards, many of 
which I found difficult or impossible to identify 
(34,37,48,55,72,75,105). Professor Wolf's German 
is uncomplicated, but entirely devoid of elegance: the 
absolute use of Erstens is unnecessarily clumsy 
(49,60,69,87), bzw., beziehungsweise is not only ugly 
but ambiguous between a real and a verbal alternative 
(76, 89, 94), and lovers of the German language will 
regret the introduction into it of such words as 
interagieren and nwralischer Akteur. The convention 
followed in the bibliography of abbreviating as St. 
names beginning with these letters has no phonetic 
justification in the case of English names and has a 
comical effect to English eyes. The absence of an index 
is to be regretted. I noted three misprints (341°, 685, 
1338) and arepeated distortion ofentire lines (1210' 279, 
10611 .4' 118
1
°'6)' The physical appearance of the book 
is elegant but serious, lacking the meretricious trappings 
of a cover illustration, with which most English 
publishers of philosophy now hire purchasers. 
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